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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY K. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060603-CA 
Not Incarcerated 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal from a court of record in a criminal case involving a third degree 
felony charge. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in denying Johnson's motion to quash the order binding 
Johnson over on a charge of threatening a judge, when the charge was premised on a 
private telephone conversation between Johnson and his divorce lawyer regarding 
Johnson's divorce, and in the absence of any proof that Johnson intended to influence a 
judge with this private conversation? 
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling was directed at the elements of the 
offense (R. 229). The preliminary hearing involved no assessment of witness credibility, 
because the State's case consisted of a tape-recorded telephone conversation and a written 
summary of a telephone conversation, which were presented by proffer of what the 
investigating officer would have testified to, had he been called (R. 31-32; R. 252: 9-11). 
Hence, this Court may address the trial court's legal reasoning, and the propriety of 
quashing the bindover order for correctness, and need not draw evidentiary inferences in 
the State's favor. See State v. Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298,1j 8 n.3, 99 P.3d 359 (where 
prosecution did not call witnesses, but relied on stipulated facts, the prosecution was not 
entitled to inferences drawn in its favor on review of the bindover order), cert, granted, 
109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). 
The issue was raised and ruled on in the lower courts (R. 36-50, 55-60, 61-65, 99, 
119-134, 162-170, 229; R. 253: 5-12). 
2. Did the district court err in denying Johnson's motion in limine seeking to bar 
his divorce lawyer from testifying about his private conversation with her regarding his 
divorce? 
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling turns on the interpretation of the 
attorney-client privilege (R. 224-228). Accordingly, this Court may review this question 
of law without deference, for correctness. See, e.g. State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, j^ 23, 
137P.3d716. 
The issue was raised and ruled on in the lower court (R. 147-159, 218-222, 224-
228; R. 253: 12-23). 
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STATUTE AND RULE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 and Utah Rule of Evidence 504 are copied in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Johnson in Sixth District Court with two counts of threatening a 
judge, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-316 (R. 6-7). 
At the preliminary hearing, the first count was premised on a written statement of 
Johnson's divorce attorney regarding a telephone conversation between her and Johnson 
on September 13, 2005, and the second count was premised on a tape recording of a 
telephone conversation between her and Johnson on September 16, 2005 (R. 31-32, 252: 
9-11). 
Following the preliminary hearing, Magistrate Wallace A. Lee dismissed the first 
count for insufficient evidence, but bound over on the second count {R. 61-63, 99). He 
transferred jurisdiction to Salt Lake County pursuant to a motion by defense counsel, 
because at the time of the telephone calls, Johnson was in the state of New Mexico, and 
his divorce lawyer was in Salt Lake County (R. 64-65). 
The State then charged Johnson in Salt Lake County, again alleging two counts of 
retaliating against a judge (R. 135-36), and moved to amend the information to premise 
two counts against two judges on one date, September 16, 2005 (R. 143-45). 
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Johnson opposed amendment of the information and moved to quash the bindover 
order (R. 36-50,55-60,61-65,99, 119-134, 162-170; R. 253: 5-12). Judge Henriod has 
yet to rule on the amendment of the information, but denied Johnson's motion to quash in 
an order copied in the addendum, which states, in relevant part: 
Whether or not Fixe! adds an element to 78-8-316(1) which is not in the 
statute the issue raised is a question for the jury. 
[Sic] (R. 229). 
Johnson filed a motion in limine invoking the attorney-client privilege to prevent 
Johnson's divorce lawyer from testifying regarding their conversation (R. 147-159, 218-
222, 224-228; R. 253: 12-23). Judge Henriod denied the motion in a memorandum 
decision which is in the addendum to this brief (R. 224-228). 
This Court granted Johnson's petition for interlocutory appeal from the trial 
court's orders denying the motion to quash and the motion in limine. See Order dated 
August 4, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 16, 2005, Johnson's divorce lawyer, Joy Jelte, called Johnson and 
surreptitiously recorded the ensuing conversation (R. 253: 17, 64-65). This call 
concerned Johnson's pending divorce, and there was no evidence that Johnson expected 
or intended for his lawyer to record or share the substance of this call with anyone (R. 
254: 2-24). The conversation was initiated by the attorney, who wished to lead Johnson 
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to repeat statements he had made in an earlier conversation so she could record them, 
unbeknownst to her client (R. 253: 16-18). She began the conversation by inquiring 
about Johnson's checklist, and he responded by inquiring about the protective order, his 
alimony, and his 401K (R. 254: 2-4). They discussed his child support and visitation, the 
property division, the protective order, whether he would exercise his right to appeal, 
whether he could afford to pay attorney fees for an appeal, the potential for reconciliation 
with his wife, the proper attorney's fees for her lawyer, whether the lawyers and judges in 
his case were following the law, whether there was perjury, ex parte contact with a judge 
or unethical conduct involved in his case, how justice should be administered, and what 
the potential consequences would be to him if he hurt someone (R. 254: 4-23). The 
majority of the conversation was interspersed with his heated expressions of frustration 
with the judges and two lawyers who had been involved in the case (R. 254: 1-24). His 
most imminent threat was to come to court in a T-shirt and Levis (R. 254: 23). When 
Jelte told him to leave his guns home, he told her that he and his crew dealt with matters 
of life and death every day and that he was not stupid (R. 254: 23). He told her he would 
play by the same rules as the judges and lawyers (R. 254: 23), and that the day would 
come when there would be justice, but that it would not be for a while (R. 254: 21). The 
conversation ended with him remarking that he did not have anything planned in the near 
future (R: 254: 24). 
A full discussion of Johnson's statements which may fairly be interpreted as 
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threats, and the absence of evidence to suggest that he intended for his statements to reach 
or influence a judge is discussed in Point I of the Argument section of the brief. 
While the tape of the conversation is apparently incomplete (R. 254: 9, 13, 24), 
the entire transcript of the tape is in the addendum to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The offense of threatening a judge requires proof of intent to influence a judge 
with a threat. The telephone conversation wherein Johnson made the alleged threats was 
a private one between him and his attorney. Because there is no evidence that he intended 
this confidential conversation to be shared with anyone, let alone for anything he said 
during this conversation to influence a judge, the evidence did not support a reasonable 
belief that Johnson harbored the requisite mens rea to sustain the charge of threatening a 
judge. Because the State failed to present credible evidence of this key element of the 
offense at the preliminary hearing, the trial court should have granted Johnson's motion to 
quash the bindover order. 
Assuming arguendo that the case proceeds to trial, this Court should hold that Jelte 
may not testify regarding her conversation with Johnson, because Johnson's intention in 
participating in the conversation was "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services" to himself, and is thus the conversation is privileged under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 504. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION TO QUASH THE 
BINDOVER ORDER. 
While magistrates issuing bindover orders are traditionally afforded some 
deference, in part because of their advantaged position in assessing the credibility of 
witnesses who appear before them, e.g.. Virgin, 2006 UT 29 at ^ 28-34,1 in the instant 
matter, the State's case at the preliminary hearing consisted of the taped phone 
conversation transcribed in the addendum to this brief (R. 31-32; R. 252: 9-11). Hence, 
this Court may review the magistrate's bindover order and address the trial court's legal 
reasoning in denying the motion to quash for correctness, and need not draw evidentiary 
inferences in the State's favor. See State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, Tf 8 n.3, 99 
P.3d 359 (where prosecution did not call witnesses, but relied on stipulated facts, the 
prosecution was not entitled to inferences drawn in its favor on review of the bindover 
order), cert granted, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). 
A bindover order must be supported by credible evidence of each element of the 
offense. Rg,, State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 20, 137 P.3d 787. In order for preliminary 
hearings to serve their essential function of "ferreting out groundless prosecutions," 
!This portion of the Virgin opinion discusses a four factor test for choosing 
appellate standards of review. See id. The Utah Supreme Court recently revised the four 
factor test, and thus modified this aspect of Virgin, but still recognizes the ability of a 
judge to observe witnesses and assess their credibility as a basis for deference. See State 
v. Levin. 2006 UT 50, Tflf 25-31, 2006 WL 2578197. 
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bindover orders may not be premised on speculation, but must be founded on evidence 
supporting a reasonable belief that the defendant committed each element of the crime 
charged. Id. atffi[20, 21. 
A. THE OFFENSE OF THREATENING A JUDGE REQUIRES PROOF OF INTENT 
TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE WITH THE THREAT. 
It is elementary that criminal offenses require the joint operation of act and intent, 
and that absent proof of mens rea with regard to each element of an offense, there is 
normally no crime proved, unless the offense at issue involves well-defined strict liability 
See, e.g.. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-101 (1) ("A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person?s conduct is prohibited 
by law; and the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, 
or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the 
definition of the offense requires; or the person's acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability."). 
The offense at issue here is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens 
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons 
and Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge 
or member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or 
member's official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or 
member on account of the performance of those official duties. 
The gravamen of the third degree felony offense with which Johnson stands 
charged is making the threat (the actus reus) with the specific intent to impede, 
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intimidate, or interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's 
official duties, or with the specific intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the 
performance of those official duties (the mens red). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1), 
supra. This is reflected in the plain language of subsection (l),2 and is confirmed by 
reviewing subsections (2) and (3),3 which define other crimes with the same mens rea, but 
different actus reuses. See id.4 
If there is no foreseeable way that the threat would be communicated to the judge, 
the requisite intent for the third degree felony of threatening a judge is lacking, because a 
2Out of deference to the Legislature's lawmaking domain, courts routinely interpret 
statutes in accordance with their plain language. See, e.g.. State v. Rivera. 933 P.2d 1344, 
1345 (Utah 1977). 
3In interpreting a statute, it is appropriate for the Court to view the statute as a 
whole, to insure that the objective of the statute is properly ascertained, and that the 
separate provisions are interpreted harmoniously. See, e.g.. Sentry Investigations Inc. v. 
Davis. 841 P.2d 732, 734 (Utah App. 1992). 
4Subsections (2) and (3) provide: 
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person commits an 
assault on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole with the 
intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of the 
board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official 
duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account 
of the performance of those official duties. 
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits 
aggravated assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with the judge or member of the board while engaged in the 
performance of the judge's or member's official duties or with the purpose 
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of 
those official duties. 
9 
person cannot utter a threat with the intent or expectation that the threat will influence or 
punish the judge if there is no foreseeable way for the judge to learn of the threat. 
See State v. FixeL 945 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1997). 
In FixeL the defendant appeared in the Fourth District Court for a bail hearing. He 
was seated in the jury box awaiting his return to jail and was apparently upset about the 
bail determination. As the defendant was being lead to a transport vehicle, he stood 
immediately behind an officer and loudly stated, "When I get out the judge is dead." His 
voice could be heard up to fifteen feet away. The officer thereafter informed the court of 
the threat. See id. at 150. In appealing from his conviction for threatening a judge, the 
defendant alleged prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor's argument that he did not 
have to prove that Fixel intended to kill the judge, but only had to prove that Fixel uttered 
the threat with the intent to retaliate. Id. 
This Court began by recognizing that the charging statute "makes it a crime to 
threaten a judge with the intent to interfere with the performance of a judge's official 
duties or the intent to retaliate against the judge for the performance of official duties." 
945 P.2d at 151. This Court rejected Fixel's contention that the charging statute required 
proof of intent to carry out the threat, because the statute contained no language 
indicating that intent to carry out the assault, kidnaping or murder or to take action "in 
that general direction" was essential to the crime. 945 P.2d at 151-52. The Court found 
that Fixel's utterance of the threat within the earshot of the bailiff was sufficient proof of 
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his intent to influence the judge, and that the evidence thus sustained his conviction and 
supported the prosecutor's argument, because it was indeed irrelevant whether Fixel truly 
intended to kill the judge. The Court explained: 
As indicated, whether Fixel "really" had the intention to do any such thing, 
or whether he made the threat knowing he would never lift a finger against 
the judge, is irrelevant under the statute. The jury was free to infer that 
when Fixel uttered his threat, he fully expected it would be conveyed to the 
judge, as it in fact was, and intended that it would intimidate the judge in 
the course of his duties, perhaps prompting some more favorable treatment 
when Fixel next appeared before him, or, as actually happened, prompting 
the judge to withdraw from cases involving Fixel. 
Alternatively, the jury could infer that Fixel uttered the threat, 
expecting it would be passed along to the judge, intending "to retaliate 
against the judge" for how he had performed his duties vis-a-vis Fixel. In 
this regard, "to retaliate" does not connote some retributive physical 
violence. Rather, it contemplates the simple concept of "pay back." See 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1938 (1986) (defining 
retaliate to mean "to return the like for; repay or requite in kind" and "to 
return like for like"). The judge, by his action, had upset Fixel. By 
threatening the judge, Fixel could perhaps upset him as well, thereby fully 
accomplishing the "pay back" that is the essence of retaliation. 
Id at 152 (footnotes omitted). 
The conclusion of the Fixel Court in requiring an expectation that the judge would 
learn of the threat is sound. One cannot intend to influence a judge (whether by 
impeding, intimidating or paying him or her back) with a threat that the person does not 
intend the judge to learn of. See id. See also United States v. Fenton, 30 F.Supp.2d 520, 
527-28 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 115, the federal 
statute the Fixel Court recognized as parallel to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316, because the 
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defendant told an insurance adjuster that he was going to kill a congressman, when there 
was no evidence that the insurance agent would convey the remark to the congressman, 
and thus there was no proof of intent to impede, interfere with, intimidate or retaliate 
against congressman in the course of his official duties). See also State v. Lucero, 2002 
UT App 135, TJ 11 n.l, 47 P.3d 107 (in refusing to address a claim of insufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction for threatening a public official, the Court noted the 
appellant's failure to cite Fixel, which the Court cited for the parenthetical proposition, 
"holding mere utterance of a threat, without specified intent, could not satisfy Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-316(1999)."). 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT JOHNSON HARBORED THE 
REQUISITE INTENT TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE WITH HIS STATEMENTS. 
In the instant matter, the State presented no evidence that Johnson uttered any 
remark with the intent that the remark would reach or influence any judge in any way. 
Rather, the State only proved various inflammatory statements made by an angry client to 
his lawyer in the course of discussing the subject matter of the legal representation - the 
divorce case. Because there was no evidence that Johnson uttered any threat with the 
requisite intent to influence any judge, the trial court should have quashed the bindover 
order. See Fixel and Virgin, supra. 
While it does not appear legally necessary to do so, Johnson will marshal the 
evidence which supports the issuance of the bindover for threatening a judge, which 
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requires proof of a threat to assault, kidnap or murder a judge made with the intent to 
impede, intimidate or interfere with a judge's performance of his official duties, or with 
the intent to retaliate against a judge on account of the judge's performance of his official 
duties. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 and State v. Fixel 945 P.2d 149, (Utah 
App. 1997), discussed further infra. 
Johnson does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable 
cause that he made requisite threatening statements regarding judges in Sevier County. 
The following statements could support such a finding: 
[H]e's going to have what's coming to him. 
All of the Mowers - yeah[.] 
(R.254:6). 
I've seen firsthand the corruption in Severe County, and you know what? 
I'm not going to take it no more. After one, the rest are free. 
After one, the rest are free. 
(R. 254: 9). 
I've had it. It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know what? The legal system is 
so injust and corrupt, that I'm going to take care of it by myself. That's all 
there is to it. 
(R. 254: 10). 
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Only after I take a bunch of people with me. I'm not going to go by 
myself. I can guarantee it. 
(R. 254: 10). 
And you know what? If 20 years ago, if 5 years ago, if 10 years ago 
men would stand up and say, "You know what? I'm tired of being screwed 
by Utah," and take action on their own, maybe somebody would say, "You 
know what? Maybe this isn't right. We're getting Judges knocked off left 
and right. Maybe this isn't right." 
(R. 254: 11). 
The only problem is, I don't care. If I can get four or five people in 
Sanpete and Sevier County and they take me out, it's a better world, isn't it? 
(R. 254: 12). 
You know what? I told my buddy about it. I've got a pretty close 
friend, and he told me - he said, "You know what you're not going to get 
caught, but you're going to go to hell." It's worth it. 
(R. 254: 13). 
He's telling me I'm going to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know 
what? 
(R. 254: 14). 
Go out with a bang. 
(R. 254: 17). 
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Because the time they catch up with me, after one, the rest are free. 
Yep, I'll make my mark. 
(R.254: 17). 
Well you know what? You know what? At the end of the day, the 
people that are doing the same thing, they won't do it no more. 
(R. 254: 19). 
If I can get four or five and they catch me, so what? I'm still ahead. 
(R.254: 21). 
The day will come, and it won't be for awhile. The day will come 
there will be justice, and the world will be a better place. 
(R.254: 21). 
But all that said, you know what? If I leave it alone, things are just 
going to go on as usual. It's just going to keep happening to somebody else. 
Judges refuse to follow the law, and attorney - yet. You know what? It's 
got to end sometime. 
(R. 254: 23-24). 
There is no evidence to marshal in support of the element that Johnson bore the 
requisite intent to influence any judge with the vituperative statements he made to his 
lawyer, or that he expected any judge to learn of his statements. He did not instruct his 
lawyer to convey any threats to the judges or to anyone else, and she did not indicate that 
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such threats would be conveyed. 
Jelte asked him what Judge Mower would have to do (apparently referring to what 
the judge should do to be just), and Johnson replied that Mower would have to make up 
for granting the protective order to his wife and permitting her to take everything but his 
shaving equipment and his steel (R. 254: 15). Jelte asked what Judge Lyman would have 
to do, Johnson indicated that if his wife's lawyer reimbursed him $150,000, then Lyman 
and Johnson would be even (R. 254: 16). When Johnson indicated that he did not think 
that would happen and Jelte confirmed that it would not, he reiterated that it would not 
happen, and remarked "So there's just life, liberty and justice for all." (R. 254: 16). In 
this conversation, Johnson merely answered his lawyer's vague questions apparently 
asking him what the judges would have to do to be just in his opinion. Nothing in this 
conversation is fairly read as an intimation that his lawyer should or would inform the 
judges of any threats by Johnson. 
When his lawyer asked him whom he had been discussing his plans with, he 
declined to say, stating, "Nobody. Nobody else needs to be in this." (R. 254: 14). When 
she asked details about what he was planning to do, he said he did not think he would tell 
her, because it would not benefit her and would not benefit him if he told (R. 254: 15). 
In sum, the conversation is properly viewed as a private conversation between 
Johnson and his divorce lawyer concerning his profound anger and frustration with the 
litigation of his divorce. While various of his statements are fairly read as threats to 
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assault or kill judges, there is no evidence that he intended his statements to reach or 
influence any judge. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT. 
Judge Henriod's ruling on the motion to quash, that the elements of the offense as 
defined by Fixel were for the jury to determine (R. 229), is legally incorrect in two ways. 
First, district court judges have jurisdiction and are required to review bindover orders 
from magistrates, to determine whether their jurisdiction, which is premised on a proper 
bindover from a preliminary hearing, is sound. See, e.g.. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 
464, 466 (Utah 1991). The matter cannot be left for a jury's determination, for our courts 
generally hold that any deficiency in preliminary hearings is rendered moot by the full 
panoply of procedural rights afforded to a criminal defendant in a jury trial. See kL at 467 
n.6. Second, it is one of the most elementary duties of a trial court to define the elements 
of crimes for juries in proper jury instructions. See, e.g.. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 
(Utah 1980) (absence of accurate jury instruction on the elements of the offense 
constitutes structural error). 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order and require the bindover order 
quashed. See Fixel, Virgin, supra. 
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IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT 
JOHNSON'S ATTORNEY FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE 
CONTENTS OF THEIR CONVERSATION REGARDING HIS 
PENDING DIVORCE. 
The trial court's denial of the motion in limine seeking to bar Joy Jelte from 
testifying about her telephone conversation with Johnson was premised on the theory that 
his statements against the trial judges in his divorce were not necessary to Jelte's 
rendition of legal services, and thus were not covered by the attorney-client privilege (R. 
224-227). Given that the ruling turns on the court's interpretation of the attorney-client 
privilege, a brief overview of the relevant law is in order. 
The attorney-client privilege "is intended to encourage candor between attorney 
and client and promote the best possible representation of the client.'1 Gold Standard, Inc. 
v. American Barrick Resources (USA). Inc.. 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). "It is the 
oldest of the common law privileges protecting confidential communications." Doe v. 
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999). The privilege is contained in Utah Rule of Evidence 
504 and is codified by Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2), although the rule is generally read 
as supplanting the statute. See, e.g., Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2003 UT 
39, Tf 20 n.3, 78 P.3d 603. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 provides clients with 
parallel protection with regard to their lawyers' duty to maintain confidentiality,5 but the 
5The rule provides, in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
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ethical rules and the privilege are not coextensive, and thus, Rule 1.6, governing ethically 
conduct of a lawyer, does not control the admissibility of the lawyer's testimony in court, 
which is governed by Rule 504. Cf. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2003 UT 
39, ^ 14 n.2, 78 P.3d 603. See also, e ^ , Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436 
(Mass. 1997); infra. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 504 provides: 
(b) General Rule of Privilege, A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing 
others in matters of common interest, and among the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing 
others in matters of common interest, in any combination. 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is 
permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
Rule 1.6 did not permit Jelte to make the disclosures she did in this case because 
Johnson stated that he would not return to Richfield before the next hearing but that he 
would be present for that hearing. He also stated clearly at the end of the conversation 
that nothing would happen in the near future. Under these circumstances, especially 
where Johnson was located in New Mexico, any threatened harm was not reasonably 
certain to occur and the disclosure was not permitted by Rule 1.6. Therefore, even if Rule 
1.6 governed the admissibility and not just the disclosure of confidential statements, the 
statements would be inadmissible nonetheless. Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.6. 
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(c) Who May Claim the Privilege, The privilege may be claimed by the 
client. . . 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit 
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud[.] 
This Court may confirm the inadmissibility of Jelte's testimony under the rule of 
evidence by reviewing Purcell supra. In that case, a recently evicted tenant contacted an 
attorney, Purcell, and indicated that he would burn down his former apartment building. 
After much deliberation, the attorney informed the police and was later subpoenaed to 
testify at trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court examined rules substantially similar to 
those in Utah and determined that the initial disclosure was not unethical. However, 
"[t]he fact that the disciplinary code permitted Purcell to make the disclosure tells us 
nothing about the admissibility of the information that Purcell disclosed." Purcell 676 
N.E.2d at 438. The court ultimately held that, although ethically disclosed, the 
communication was not admissible at trial. The court reasoned that while the harm the 
client may have caused could be ameliorated by the lawyer's reporting the client's 
criminal intentions, the policy interests behind the attorney-client privilege did not permit 
the admission of the lawyer's testimony in court. The court recognized that if the 
privilege were broadened to vitiate the privilege when the crime-fraud exception truly did 
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not apply, lawyers might be less likely to report at all, in order to avoid adverse 
consequences to their clients, or might be inclined to warn their clients that such 
discussions may not be privileged, and thereby chill the clients' seeking of legal advice 
and deprive the lawyers of the opportunities to inform their clients of the governing law 
and to dissuade the clients from breaking it. Id. at 440-41. 
Other courts, like the Purcell court, recognize that the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege does not apply merely because a lawyer learns of a crime or fraud 
during the course of representation, but instead requires proof that the client was actually 
seeking the lawyer's aid in committing an offense. See, e.g.. In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 
F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1995) ("the crime-fraud exception does not apply simply because 
privileged communications would provide an adversary with evidence of a crime or 
fraud[;]n to invoke exception, there must be proof that legal communications were in 
furtherance of crime). 
In the instant case, the substance of the conversation and recording are not 
admissible under Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. There is nothing in the 
Johnson-Jelte conversation intimating that Johnson was seeking Jelte's assistance in 
committing any crime, and thus the crime-fraud exception does not apply. See, 
e.g., Purcell, supra. The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 504 state, "The 
client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to 
prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who were involved in the conference or 
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learned, without the knowledge of the client, the content of the confidential 
communication." Here, the State learned of the confidential information "without the 
knowledge of the client." Therefore, where none of the exceptions to the rule are 
applicable, Johnson is entitled to prevent the privileged information from being disclosed 
to the jury. See id. 
Johnson's statements were made in the course of a telephone conversation between 
him and his divorce lawyer concerning the pending divorce. In the course of this 
discussion, his lawyer was giving him legal advice concerning legitimate details in his 
divorce, the potential ramifications of his actions, and the advisability of attending court 
and letting the process address his concerns (R. 254 at 2-24). The telephone conversation 
was initiated by the lawyer, ostensibly to discuss the pending divorce, but truthfully to set 
up the client to make inflammatory statements on tape (R. 253: 16-18). If this Court 
were to condone the trial court's ruling, parsing out statements threatening judges 
involved in the divorce at issue from the remainder of the legal conversation, this would 
undoubtedly undermine the policy interest to be served by the privilege - to encourage 
those seeking legal advice to provide all relevant information to their lawyers in order to 
obtain the best possible representation and comply with the law. See, e ^ , Gold 
Standard. Inc. v. American Barrick Resources (USA), Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 
1990), supra. 
In denying the motion in limine, the trial court chose to rely on Aviles v. State, 165 
22 
S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App. 2005), a case which is readily distinguished, because there, the 
client was not even speaking with his lawyer, but was listening to a court interpreter's 
summary of what the lawyer wanted the client to know and then informed the interpreter 
outside the hearing of his lawyer that when he got out, he was going to kill the prosecutor, 
The court understandably held that this threat was not made in an effort to obtain legal 
advice. Id. at 438-39. 
The other case Judge Henriod relied on in denying the motion in limine, Hodgson 
Russ, LLP v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), is similarly distinguished 
by the facts upon which the court's holding turned. There, the court held that a brother's 
statement to his lawyer that he would kill his sister to end the dispute over their mother's 
estate was not privileged as necessary to obtaining informed legal advice, because the 
statement was made at the end of a legal conference, as he was walking out of the office. 
Id. at 1247. 
In contrast, Johnson's statements at issue here were made intermittently in the 
course of a protracted discussion of his protracted divorce. The conversation here was 
initiated by the attorney, who wished to lead Johnson to repeat statements he had made in 
an earlier conversation so she could record them (R. 253: 16-18). She began the 
conversation by inquiring about the client's checklist, and he responded by inquiring 
about the protective order, his alimony, and his 40IK (R. 254: 2-4). They discussed his 
child support and visitation, the property division, the protective order, whether he would 
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exercise his right to appeal, whether he could afford to pay attorney fees for an appeal, 
potential for reconciliation with his wife, the proper attorney's fees for her lawyer, 
whether the lawyers and judges in his case were following the law, whether there was 
perjury, ex parte contact with a judge or unethical conduct involved in his case, how 
justice should be administered, and what the potential consequences were to him if he 
hurt someone (R. 254: 4-23). While he did repeatedly and heatedly express frustration 
with the judges, two lawyers, and the functioning of the judicial system, his most 
imminent threat was to come to court in a T-shirt and Levis (R. 254: 23). When Jelte told 
him to leave his guns home, he told her that he and his crew dealt with matters of life and 
death every day and he was not stupid (R. 254: 23). The conversation ended with him 
remarking that he did not have anything planned in the near future (R: 254: 24). 
On these facts, it is fairly concluded that Johnson's participation in this 
conversation with his lawyer about his pending divorce and the upcoming hearing was 
"for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to himself. 
Accordingly, it is privileged under Utah Rule of Evidence 504. See Purcell supra. 
Compare Aviles and Hodson Russ, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's orders denying the motion to quash the 
bindover order and denying the motion in limine. 
S H„v„f Respectfully submitted this U day o . 2006. 
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TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DENYING MOTION IN LIMINE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 051909162 
v. : Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
JEFFERY K. JOHNSON, : Date: June 14, 2 0 06 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court 
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should 
be DENIED, 
At issue here is whether an attorney is allowed to testify against 
a former client regarding threats the client allegedly made against a 
number of judges and conveyed to his attorney. Defendant concedes that 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(l)1 allowed his attorney to 
report Defendant's alleged statement to law enforcement authorities in 
order to prevent Defendant from acting on the threats. However, 
Defendant argues that his alleged statements are still privileged and so 
his attorney cannot testify regarding them in Defendant's criminal 
prosecution. The State disagrees and argues that Defendant's statements 
were not privileged and, therefore, his attorney is allowed to disclose 
the statements during these criminal proceedings. 
The Court recognizes that this issue is one of first impression 
here in Utah. Additionally, there appears to be a split among the other 
limited jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. Therefore, the 
Court does not undertake this decision lightly. However, the Court 
finds that Defendant's statements were not privileged and Defendant's 
former attorney may testify against Defendant at his trial. 
It is clear that only " [c] onf idential disclosures by a client to an 
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged. The 
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure 
to their attorneys [in order to obtain fully informed legal advice.]" 
Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (internal citations omitted). 
Rule 1.6(b)( 1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
(b) A lawyers may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(l)(b) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. 
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achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures -
necessary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not have been 
made absent the privilege." Id. 
Courts seem to have split on how to apply the attorney-client 
privilege in circumstances such as these, where a client allegedly makes 
threats regarding other individuals to his/her attorney. The Court, 
however, is persuaded by Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005) and Hodgson Russ, LLP v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
In Aviles, the court held that when client conveyed a threat to an 
interpreter, who conveyed the threat to the client's attorney, that 
-communication was not privileged because it "was not made for the 
rendition of professional legal services and [was] therefore not covered 
by the attorney-client privilege." 165 S.W.2d at 439. Defendant argues 
that this case is distinguishable because the threat was made to an 
interpreter and not to the attorney. However, Aviles does seem 
applicable because the court found that it was not determinative whether 
the interpreter was a representative of the attorney because the 
information could not be privileged. Id. The court stated "Appellant's 
communication of a threat to kill his court-appointed interpreter can in 
no way be considered necessary to the rendition of legal services for 
his pending burglary trial. We hold that this communication of an 
intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client 
privilege, rendering irrelevant the role the interpreter may have been 
serving at the time of the communication." Id. 
Similarly, in Hodgson Russ, the court found that it was proper to 
admit an attorney's testimony against his client because "the threat 
[made by the client] was extraneous and was not a communication incident 
or necessary to obtaining legal advice." 867 So.2d at 1248. 
Defendant relies primarily on Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 
N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997). In Purcell, Mr. Tyree had gone to an attorney, 
Mr. Purcell, to discuss an employment matter. During the course of 
those discussions, Tyree made threats to burn down the apartment 
building where he had been employed. Id. at 437-38. Purcell considered 
these threats credible and reported them to the police. Id. at 438. 
After Tyree was indicted for attempted arson, the district attorney 
subpoenaed Purcell to testify. Purcell moved to quash the subpoena and 
that issue went up on appeal. Id. On appeal, the court found that 
there was no question regarding the ethical propriety of Purcell's 
disclosure of the threats to the police but that there was an issue 
regarding whether Purcell could testify at Tyree's arson trial. The 
court stated that the "attorney-client privilege applies only when the 
client's communication was for the purpose of facilitating the rendition 
of legal services. . . . A statement of an intention to commit a crime 
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made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the 
privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies. That exception 
applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or 
assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct." Id. at 115. The court 
went on to find that Tyree's communication to Purcell was privileged, 
saying, "Unless the crime-fraud exception applies, the attorney-client 
privilege should apply to communications concerning possible future, as 
well as past, criminal conduct, because an informed lawyer may be able 
to dissuade the client from improper future conduct and, if not, under 
the ethical rules may elect in the public interest to make a limited 
disclosure of the client's threatened conduct." Id. at 116. 
Defendant also relies on Kleinfeld v. State, 568 So.2d 937 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), which held that it was error to require an 
attorney to testify about his client's statement: "They [the police] 
know I did [murdered] Eric. I've got nothing to lose by doing you and 
then turning the gun on myself" because the statement was privileged. 
Id. at 939-40. However, Kleinfeld was later distinguished in Florida by 
Hodgson Russ, which stated that Kleinfeld applied only to cases where 
a privileged communication was admitted to prove an admission to a 
previous crime. 867 So. 2d at 1248. It did not apply when the 
attorney's testimony would be admitted to prove that the client intended 
to commit a future murder. Id. 
The Court finds Aviles and Hodgson Russ more persuasive than 
Purcell for a number of reasons. First, Aviles seems more in line with 
Utah's current recognition of attorney-client privilege. Specifically, 
in Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P. 2d 1254 
(1972), the court, citing to U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 F.Supp. 
357 (D. Mass. 1950), said that a party asserting -privilege has the 
burden of showing that the communication between attorney and client was 
"for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or 
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding." 
Additionally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6) provides: "A communication 
is 'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other 
than those to whom the disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of the communication." Subsection (b) of Rule 504 
goes on to say: UA client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers . . . ." It is clear that Utah holds that not 
everything a person says to his attorney is necessarily privileged. A 
person can make statements to his attorney which are not privileged 
because they are not made for the purpose of facilitating legal 
services. In the present case, Defendant did not make the threats to 
his attorney for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services." He did not seek legal advice, an opinion 
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regarding his potential actions, etc.2 While Defendant was represented 
by counsel when he made the alleged threats, his threats did not at all 
relate to counsel's representation of him. Therefore, the statements 
seem to fall under Jackson, et. al., which would exclude them from 
privilege. 
Second, Aviles/Hodgson Russ are the most recent efforts of courts 
to resolve this issue and seem to represent a growing trend in'favor of 
finding threats unprotected by attorney/client privilege. 
Finally, Aviles/Hodgson represent a more compelling policy interest 
than Purcell. Purcell argues that, in order to protect the 
attorney/client privilege, all statements made to attorneys must be 
afforded protections that they would not ordinarily be afforded. 
Aviles/Hodgson recognize that attorney/client privilege can be 
adequately protected by affording maximum protection to statements that 
are made in the context of the attorney/client relations, i.e., 
statements that are made to facilitate legal services. However, 
statements that are not made to facilitate legal services are not 
properly protected under attorney/client privilege. This services the 
interest of the attorney/client privilege while still supporting other 
important policy considerations such as facilitating prosecution of 
criminal behavior. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion 
in Limine should be DENIED because the attorney-client privilege does 
not bar Ms. Jelte from testifying at Def endSn't'^^irial. 
2
 Strangely, if Defendant had sought legal advice in order to further his alleged intended crimes, his statements 
would not be privileged according to Purcell. This could lead to the odd result diat statements made in furtherance of 
receiving advice would not be protected, while statements not made in furtherance of receiving advice would be 
protected. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on unknown date) 
3 (Phone number dialed and ringing) 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Hello? 
5 MS. JELTE: Hi. Jeff, this is Joy Jelte. I didn't — 
6 MR. JOHNSON: How are you? 
7 MS. JELTE: I almost expected to get your answering 
8 machine. I just got the transcript from the court reporter 
9 for the hearing on Monday, but I don't have your checklist. I 
10 thought you were going to fax something to me.' 
11 MR. JOHNSON: I really just don't have a fax — the only 
12 questions I have is how come the Judge never addressed Neeley 
13 about the protective order. It's not addressed in it. 
14 MS. JELTE: Yeah. I think the way he addressed it was 
15 by dismissing it. 
16 MR. JOHNSON: And the only other thing is do I have to 
17 pay back alimony when she's still drawing from my 4 01-K? It all 
18 ought to be the same, because my 401-K stops back in March. 
19 MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Or else my alimony should start from the 
21 day the decree is signed. 
22 MS. JELTE: Okay, wait. Say it again. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: She's still taking that — she'll still 
24 get money out of my 401-K; it's $500 a month. 
25 MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: That should go back to March. She'll be 
2 able to quit then, and I'll owe back alimony or else — yeah, 
3 whatever, start paying alimony from the time the decree is 
4 signed. 
5 MS. JELTE: Oh, okay. I apologize. I haven't looked 
6 at your file, and so I'm not real up to speed on what the issues 
7 are. I plan on doing that over the weekend, starting with first 
8 looking at the transcript and then going to the objection and 
9 then looking back at the other notes and so on. So I'm going to 
10 have to get up to speed on it before I do anything else. Are you 
11 going to be going to Richfield? 
12 MR. JOHNSON: For the Court date? 
13 MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. 
15 MS. JELTE: Okay, because between now and then we'll 
16 probably need to talk probably once — once more about what the 
17 issues are and what position you want to take and so on. So — 
18 but I probably won't give you a call back until Sunday when I get 
19 into it a little bit more. 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
21 MS. JELTE: I'm not going to spend that much time with 
22 it tonight other than to maybe glance at the transcript. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
24 MS. JELTE: I hope you're feeling better. 




2 MS. JELTE: Well, you get to see Caden. That's good. 
3 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, but do I want to see Caden? 
4 MS. JELTE: Sure, you do. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: I'm pretty much writing him off. 
6 MS. JELTE: Why is that? 
7 MR. JOHNSON: It's not worth it. It's not worth it 
8 every time I want to see him to have to go to Court or deal with 
9 attorneys to see him. 
10 MS. JELTE: When was the last time you saw him? 
11 MR. JOHNSON: July, 1st of July. So if she wants me 
12 miserable that's fine, but Caden -- yeah, he'll get his child 
13 support, but he's not getting any inheritance and he's not 
14 getting a dad. That's that. I've had it. I'm totally out of 
15 this whole situation. 
16 MS. JELTE: Well, I don't think that that's the best way 
17 to handle your son. He cares about you a lot, and I think that 
18 you're a better dad than that. I know you're frustrated, but I 
19 think it will pass and I think you'll get on with your life and 
20 things will get better. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: But one thing about it, when he gets older 
22 he can ask questions why, and I'll tell him then, but I — you 
23 know, I'm not — I've had it. 
24 MS. JELTE: What about your other son? Have you seen 
25 him lately? 
-6-
MR. JOHNSON: Oh, I talk to him quite often. So yep, I 
think the Court system in Utah is screwed up. 
MS. JELTE: I know you feel that way right now, but it 
will — I think --
MR. JOHNSON: You can't tell me in 20 years I'm going to 
feel it's right. I lost $200,000 and she made a profit. You 
can't tell me I'll think better about it in 20 years. 
MS. JELTE: No, I was saying you'd think — I think you 
need to wait and let us get through the emotions and everything. 
I think right now you're — 
MR. JOHNSON: The Judge hasn't ruled in on one thing to 
help me not one time, not either Judge. So no, I'm never going 
to come around. 
MS. JELTE: Well, I think Mower tries to do a good job, 
and — 
MR. JOHNSON: He's a slime ball. He's a liar and he's 
unethical, and he's going to have what's coming to him. 
MS. JELTE: I think — 
MR. JOHNSON: All of the Mowers — yeah, he's a 
hypocrite. He doesn't follow the law. He's the Judge. He 
doesn't follow the law. 
MS. JELTE: I think that when you — you need to reserve 
judgment until we get through this next hearing. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, we'll see, but I'm — it's not going 
to change. I think Lyman is a piece of shit. 
-7-
1 MS. JELTE: I know it would have helped if he had heard 
2 your motion about the debts before you finally couldn't take it 
3 anymore and filed bankruptcy. I know that would have helped, but 
4 I — that Judge, too, Lyman, I think, tries to — 
5 MR. JOHNSON: How can the Judge sit there and think, 
6 okay, you have a hundred and some thousand dollars income, and 
7 you take half the income away and give the guy all the bills and 
8 have him pay it all and think, well, it's going to be rosy, and 
9 that go a year? Oh, but give her all the assets in the meantime. 
10 You know what? Fair and equitable, did that come into play at 
11 any time? I don't think so. No. 
12 MS. JELTE: Well, you still have the right to appeal, 
13 and that — 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, but what good is that going to do? 
15 MS. JELTE: That's — 
16 MR. JOHNSON: Really. It's in Utah. 
17 MS. JELTE: — 20 days from the date that the decree is 
18 finally signed. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: I think, you know what, the better way — 
20 I have no faith in the Court system. I have no faith in it at 
21 all. The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make 
22 it fair. 
23 MS. JELTE: Well — 
24 MR. JOHNSON: They go by the same principles everybody 
25 else is playing by. Does Neeley play by the rules? No. Does 
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1 the Court system play by the rules? Is the Court system fair? 
2 Do they follow the law? No, they don't. You've got Lyman 
3 signing — I'm not even represented, and he's signing bills. 
4 He's not following the law on judgments he's making. He's not 
5 following the law. So how can he expect people to follow the 
6 law if he refuses? It's not going to happen. 
7 MS. JELTE: Well, I think if you go back to that first 
8 hearing, I think you've forgotten about what she was testifying 
9 to about how she thought that the bills were generated because — 
10 from debt that you had acquired and that had been rolled over. 
11 That's where Lyman was coming from. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: And so it's safe to say that the Court 
13 thinks that she should live in a house rent free, be able to 
14 pocket all the cash she wants and live rent free, free of any 
15 obligations for two years and be fine. She has no obligation. 
16 She wasn't paying for the house. The Court system is screwed. 
17 MS. JELTE: I think Judge Lyman — 
18 MR. JOHNSON: He's an asshole. 
19 MS. JELTE: Well, I think one of the reasons he got off 
20 the case had to do with concerns about that ex parte protective 
21 order and having Judge Mower hear it to have somebody fresh and 
22 anew to try to resolve the case. I think Mower tried. I think 
23 he missed some points, and that's what the hearing on Monday is 
24 about, is to try to get him to try to close up those holes in 
25 your case and get that resolved. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: But the end judgment is not going to 
2 change. I'm still screwed. 
3 MS. JELTE: I think if you can just — let's get through 
4 this hearing. I think you'll feel better, and I think you'll 
5 feel a lot better and things will — 
6 MR. JOHNSON: Well — 
7 I MS. JELTE: If you just give it some time and distance. 
8 Then if you want to pursue your appeal, fine, but — 
9 MR. JOHNSON: Maybe I'll appeal it, maybe I won't, but 
10 I don't have any faith in the legal system. I can handle it by 
11 myself, because you know what? Yeah, there's too much corruption. 
12 I've seen all — I've seen firsthand the corruption in Sevier 
13 County, and you know what? I'm not going to take it no more. 
14 After one, the rest are free. 
15 MS. JELTE: I'm sorry, what did you say? 
16 MR. JOHNSON: After one, the rest are free. 
17 MS. JELTE: Oh. 
18 MR. JOHNSON: I've had it. This has went as bad as it 
19 could — 
20 (Tape cuts out and then starts again) 
21 MS. JELTE: But your parents — 
22 MR. JOHNSON: And they can put me in jail. You know 
23 what? They can put me in jail for 60 days. They can put me in 
24 jail for a year, and all it's going to do is piss me off more. 
25 They can take away my guns, and all it's going to do is piss me 
-10-
off more. I've had it. It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know 
what? The legal system is so injust and corrupt, that I'm going 
to take care of it by myself. That's all there is to it. 
MS. JELTE: I think you need to be thinking about both 
of your children, and I think — 
MR. JOHNSON: I'm not — I don't even plan on seeing 
both of my children anymore. I was a damn good dad, but this 
stage in the game, you know what? That's not even — I don't — 
you know what? It doesn't even matter. 
MS. JELTE: Jeff, are you suicidal right now? 
MR. JOHNSON: Only after I take out a bunch of people 
with me. I'm not going to go by myself. I can guarantee it. 
MS. JELTE: Well, you've got two really wonderful 
parents who love you dearly. 
MR. JOHNSON: And that's not the problem. 
MS. JELTE: No. 
MR. JOHNSON: The problem is the damn system. The 
problem is, she makes a profit and I go bust. The problem is 
my first attorney before I talked to you said, "Lyman has already 
judged on you because of the shit that Dale Eyre told him." You 
know what? Dale Eyre and the Judge are not even supposed to talk 
about me. 
MS. JELTE: You've got two beautiful children. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I wrote them both off. 
MS. JELTE: And you've got two wonderful parents, and 
- 1 1 -
1 you need to think about how your decisions will affect those 
2 people. 
3 MR. JOHNSON: And you know what? If 20 years ago, if 5 
4 years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say, "You know 
5 what? I'm tired of being screwed by Utah," and take action on 
6 their own, maybe somebody would say, "You know what? Maybe this 
7 isn't right. We're getting Judges knocked off left and right. 
8 Maybe this isn't right." 
9 MS. JELTE: It's called working with your Legislature 
10 and working — 
11 MR. JOHNSON: No, the law is just. When the Legislature 
12 says "fair and equitable," when they write a protective order 
13 and said if the person is attacked and they attack back in self-
14 defense, if they do something in self-defense then it shouldn't 
15 be held to a protective order. Then you look at Judge Lyman 
16 who says, "Oh, yeah, it's fine for somebody to attack in self-
17 defense, and if you respond back then it's malicious," he's not 
18 following the Legislature. Fair and equitable, I don't think 
19 anywhere in my case is fair and equitable. 
20 MS. JELTE: That's when you take it up on appeal. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: No, that's — by — you know what? So I 
22 can spend 40 more thousand dollars and get it stuck up my ass 
23 again. No. 
24 MS. JELTE: The problem is is that what — if you — 
25 from — if you — 
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MR. JOHNSON: The only problem is, I don't care. If I 
can get four or five people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they 
take me out, it's a better world, isn't it? 
MS. JELTE: No, hon, that's — 
MR. JOHNSON: And if I can take out their DNA offspring, 
it's even better. 
MS. JELTE: Hon, that's not the way you solve the 
problem. 
MR. JOHNSON: It is at this point. 
MS. JELTE: No, because then all you're going to do is 
break your parents' heart and devastate your children, and your 
children will be — have this legacy that is horrible for them to 
face. You're too good a man for that. You're upset right now. 
MR. JOHNSON: No, I've been upset for years. I'm past 
upset. I want justice. 
MS. JELTE: Jeff, ever since I've met you you've been a 
real concerned dad about your children and what you wanted for 
them. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's past that. It's past that. The 
State of Utah doesn't give a shit about my kids. The — you 
know what? Judge Lyman didn't give a fuck if I starved Jordan 
to death when I had him. He didn't care about kids. 
MS. JELTE: You would break your parents' heart and your 
children, and you know that. 
MR. JOHNSON: But if the world's a better place after I 
-13-
1 leave, you know what? That's all that matters, right? 
2 MS. JELTE: I don't know what you're planning, hon, but 
3 I just — I want you not to do whatever it is you're thinking 
4 about, and I'm serious. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: You know what? I told my buddy about it. 
6 I've got a pretty close friend, and he told me — he said, "You 
7 know what, you're not going to get caught, but you're going to go 
8 to hell." It's worth it. 
9 MS. JELTE: I wish your friend had told you to — not 
10 to do whatever it is you're talking about doing. It doesn't 
11 sound like much of a friend to me. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: It's just you know what? You've got the 
13 make the world a better place. 
14 MS. JELTE: That's not making the world a better place. 
15 MR. JOHNSON: Of course it is. You know what? Once 
16 a Judge gets on the bench, they're held — they don't have any 
17 accountability. You know what? If being an attorney is how bad 
18 you can screw somebody, and work outside the law and sit up there 
19 and lie, you know what? There's no accountability there. 
20 (Tape cuts out and then starts again) 
21 MR. JOHNSON:. Guess what? 
22 MS. JELTE: Who's your friend that — 
23 MR. JOHNSON: I'm that somebody. 
24 MS. JELTE: Who's your friend that's encouraging you to 
































JOHNSON: No, he's not encouraging me. He's telling 
to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know 
JELTE: Who are you talking about? 
MR. JOHNSON: Nobody. Nobody else needs to be in this. 
Neeley is an asshole. You know what? To this day if he wouldn't 
have took the steps that he took, I'm sure me and the ex could 
have got back together. 
MS. JELTE: I don't know that Corrinne — 
MR. JOHNSON: You know what, me — 
MS. JELTE: I don't know that Corrinne was asking him 
for advice on whether to reconcile. I think he was pretty 
shocked that you guys were trying to reconcile. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? I don't really care. 
I know he distorted the facts. I know he's an asshole. I know 
he's had multiple affairs. So you know what? He's an asshole. 
If he's going to screw me for everything he can, for money, 
legal or not, you know, he'll do whatever he can, then he should 
anticipate me screwing him for every way I can, legal or not. If 
he has no ethics, he shouldn't expect people he's screwing to 
have ethics. You know, that's the bottom line. 
MS. JELTE: So — 
MR. JOHNSON: He took away my kids. I'll take away his 
kids. 
MS. JELTE: So what are you planning on doing, kiddo? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: I don't think I'll tell you, you know. It 
2 won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you. 
3 MS. JELTE: Well, I know one thing. You — I don't — 
4 it doesn't matter what you're talking about doing or what you're 
5 thinking about doing. You need to just not do it, and you need 
6 to — if you need to sit down with a counselor or somebody and 
7 talk to them about how angry and upset you are — 
8 MR. JOHNSON: Is that going to give me my $300,000 back? 
9 I don't think so. Is that going to make Neeley a better person? 
10 I don't think so. 
11 MS. JELTE: But who cares about how Neeley is or who he 
12 is or what he does in the future? 
13 MR. JOHNSON: It's called justice. Why should I continue 
14 to sit idly by and let him fuck people over, to let him do it to 
15 somebody else. I know with you it's — you know, it's the job, 
16 it's the game; but with people involved it's not. 
17 MS. JELTE: I don't think that — 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. If Neeley writes me a check for 
19 $150,000, I'll call it even with him. 
20 MS. JELTE: And what does the Judge have to do? 
21 MR. JOHNSON: Well, if he ~ let's see, the Judge. I 
22 think Sevier County Judge Mower, he's the one that signed the 
23 protective order for her to go remove everything except for my 
24 personal shaving articles, and steel. He won't give them back. 







































And what about 
: I don't know 
be even, won't 
Well, Jeff — 
: But I don't 
Judge Lyman? 
If Neeley gives me 
we? 
see that happening. 
No, it's not going to happen. 
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\ the 150 
It's not going to happen. So there's just 
liberty and justice for all. 
MS. JELTE: You said the other day something that really 
scared me, Jeff. You said that you 
would end. Now, I don't know what ] 
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I really am worried about you. 
Well, you know what, maybe people ought to 
I'd like to see you --
You know, in the whole Court situation 


















And so what are you — 
That's not going to happen. 
— going to do? 
Go out with a bang. 
No, you're not going to do that. Look — 
No. No, actually, I plan on — just 
Look — 
Because the time they catch up with me, 







JELTE: No, hon, you're not going to do that. 
to — you're just going to take a deep breath, and 
to go tc 
see if you car 
something stupid. 
ilk to somebody about it, and you're going to 
L just get clear headed so that you don't do 
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MR. JOHNSON: I have counseling for free, Joy. 
MS. JELTE: Well, then go. 
MR. JOHNSON: Why? They're not going to get my money 
back. You know what? I know what's right. I know what's just. 
It just seems like everybody else has no idea. 
MS. JELTE: I know that whatever -- if you — you know, 
if you — the other day you were talking about hurting Doug and 
you were talking about hurting the Judge, and you were talking 
about hurting — taking away property and family and so on. That 
is -- all you're talking about is destruction. So how is that 
justice? It's not. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. When somebody takes away all my 
property, my family, everything I've worked for, $200,000, 
totally destroying me, what are they talking about? 
MS. JELTE: Well — 
MR. JOHNSON: And they don't follow the law to do it. 
MS. JELTE: You haven't pursued every avenue of appeal. 
MR. JOHNSON: Joy, how many hundreds of thousands of 
dollars can I afford in attorney fee — fees, which I'll never 
gain back. I'll never gain back. For what? How many hundreds 
of thousand dollars is it worth living my life hell to get back 
justice which they'll never pay the price for. There is no 
accountability on the other side. There's not. 
MS. JELTE: And so you do something destructive, and you 
ruin your life and you ruin your kids' lives and you ruin your 
-19-
1 parents' lives and — 
2 MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? You know what? At 
3 the end of the day, the people that are doing the same thing, 
4 they won't do it no more. 
5 MS. JELTE: The only — 
6 MR. JOHNSON: This isn't something I just conjured up. 
7 MS. JELTE: I — 
8 I MR. JOHNSON: I mean, I've been thinking about this 
9 since I've been living in Utah. I mean, it was good to move to 
10 New Mexico. I'm damn glad I did, but it's just — you know what? 
11 What's right is right. 
12 MS. JELTE: Your — Jeff, as far as I can tell, none of 
13 us have the moral right to pass judgment on another human being. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: But they have, haven't they? 
15 MS. JELTE: You can get on with your life. If you do 
16 something that ends the life of another person, you disrupt so 
17 much, not just your life, but their life and the people that love 
18 them — 
19 MR. JOHNSON: Boy, I'd hate to disrupt their life. 
20 MS. JELTE: — and the people that love you and are 
21 concerned about you and care about you. 
22 MR. JOHNSON: And I'm sure that all that consideration 
23 went into the judgments and into Court, didn't it? They was 
24 really concerned about how bad they destroyed me, wasn't.they? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? If I can get four or 
2 five and they catch me, so what? I'm still ahead. 
3 MS. JELTE: No, you're not ahead. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, I am. 
5 MS. JELTE: No. Hon, look, I want you to just go talk 
6 to a counselor, okay? 
7 MR. JOHNSON: No. They're not going to give me back 
8 $200,000. Neeley is not going to give me back the money he 
9 screwed from me. The Judge sure as hell is not going to give 
10 me any money back. No. The day will come, and it won't be for 
11 awhile. The day will come there will be justice, and the world 
12 will be a better place. 
13 MS. JELTE: Well, as your attorney and your friend, 
14 I'm not going to give up on you. We're going to be talking about 
15 this hearing coming up Monday. I'm going to be talking with you 
16 and checking with you this weekend, because I just think you're 
17 just down right now. It may not feel like you're down, but I 
18 think — 
19 MR. JOHNSON: I've been down — 
20 MS. JELTE: — you're just depressed. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: — for three years. 
22 MS. JELTE: Well, what — 
23 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not depressed, Joy. I mean, after I 
24 get off the phone with you, it's Friday night, I'll go out and 
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Well, then don't blow it. 
Why? 
Because --
There's no justice. There still has to be 
Because — 
There's none in Utah. 
But you're not — no — you're not the 
around administering justice. 
Then who is that — 
I'm not the person --
Who is that person? Is it Judges that 
' Is that the person that's supposed to be 
assigning justice? 
MS. JELTE: Yeah, but you're talking — 
MR. JOHNSON: Judges that refuse to follow the law? 
MS. JELTE: You're talking about taking action to hurt 
somebody else. 
MR. JOHNSON: Did somebody take action against me to 
hurt me; yes or no? 
MS. JELTE: We don't live out in a — we may live out 
in the west, but we don't act like it. We don't carry guns, we 
don't kill people, we don't harm property, and you know that. 
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1 I just going to keep happening to somebody else. Judges refuse to 
2 follow the law, and attorney — yep. You know what? It's got to 
3 end sometime. 
4 MS. JELTE: Look, I'm not going to get in an argument 
5 with you about this. I just think that you're just not thinking 
6 clearly, and I think you'11 feel better after the next hearing, 
7 and I want you to snap out of it. 
8 I'm sincere as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend 
9 to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I really want you 
10 to snap out of it, Jeff. You know better. 
11 MR. JOHNSON: Well, I don't have anything planned in the 
12 near future. 
13 (Tape cuts out. No further proceedings on tape.) 
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GOVERNING STATUTE AND RULE 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-316 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens 
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons 
and Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge 
or member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or 
member's official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or 
member on account of the performance of those official duties. 
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person 
commits an assault on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or 
member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or 
member's official duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or 
member on account of the performance of those official duties. 
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits 
aggravated assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with the judge or member of the board while engaged in the 
performance of the judge's or member's official duties or with the purpose 
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of 
those official duties. 
(4) As used in this section: 
(a) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse, 
surviving spouse, children, and siblings of the officer. 
(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record and 
courts not of record. 
(c) "Judge or member" includes the members of the 
judge's or member's immediate family. 
(d) "Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole" 
means appointed members of the board. 
(5) A member of the Board of Pardons and Parole is an executive 
officer for purposes of Subsection 76-5-202(1 )(k). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 504 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or 
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either 
public or private, who is rendered professional legal services 
by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to 
obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably 
believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any 
state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to 
assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having 
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on 
advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or 
one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer 
concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the 
lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes 
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the 
lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the 
professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended 
to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client 
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client between 
the client and the client's representatives, 
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers 
representing others in matters of common 
interest, and among the client's representatives, 
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers 
representing others in matters of common 
interest, in any combination. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The 
privilege may be claimed by the client, the 
client's guardian or conservator, the personal 
representative of a deceased client, or the 
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a 
corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence. The person who 
was the lawyer at the time of the 
communication is presumed to have authority to 
claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under 
this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of Crime or 
Fraud. If the services of the 
lawyer were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or 
plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have 
known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants Through 
Same Deceased Client. As to a 
communication relevant to an 
issue between parties who claim 
through the same deceased client, 
regardless of whether the claims 
are by testate or intestate 
succession or by inter vivos 
transaction; or 
(3) Breach of Duty by 
Lawyer or Client. As to a 
communication relevant to an 
issue of breach of duty by the 
lawyer to the client or by the 
client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document Attested by 
Lawyer. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue concerning a 
document to which the lawyer is 
an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint Clients. As to a 
communication relevant to a 
matter of common interest 
between two or more clients if the 
communication was made by any 
of them to a lawyer retained or 
consulted in common, when 
offered in an action between any 
of the clients. 
